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Using the Right Tool: David Woodward’s Suggested 
Framework and the Study of Military Cartography
In 1974 David Woodward suggested a framework for organizing the study of the history of cartography that unified 
on one hand the process and the output of cartographic production, and on the other hand the four sequential phases 
of cartographic production, from information gathering through document use. In a survey of scholars who have cited 
Woodward’s model I note that, while this framework has influenced the conceptual development of map history, it has 
rarely been applied rigorously to specific instances of mapping. I argue that this model is an underutilized tool in carto-
graphic scholarship, and that Woodward’s matrix is ideally suited to examining how military units carry out mapping. 
Because military units, particularly large ones, are in effect self-contained systems that cyclically produce, use, and repro-
duce their own maps, I contend that scholars can modify Woodward’s original model in content, though not in structure, 
to study military mapping activities. To illustrate this point, I present as a case study the British military’s Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force (EEF) during the Gaza Campaign of late 1917. This force performed a broad range of mapping ac-
tivity, much of it innovative. A modification of the Woodward framework that brings together the specific elements of the 
EEF’s information gatherers, information processors, and map users into a single cohesive cartographic system illustrates 
the value and utility of this framework for studying the history of military cartography.
K E Y W O R D S :  military geography; military cartography; history of cartography; David Woodward (1942–2004)
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The dictum that any work can be made easier if one 
first takes the time to select and use the proper tool is as 
applicable to academic research as to any other activity. 
One conceptual tool that has remained largely unused 
in the metaphorical toolbox of academic cartographers is 
David Woodward’s (1974) suggested framework for study-
ing the history of cartography. Recent renewed interest in 
the history and practice of military cartography, prompt-
ed partially by the centenary of World War I, has high-
lighted an area of study that can benefit substantially from 
this old but still powerful tool. Woodward’s framework is 
well suited to studying military cartography because it ac-
commodates the cyclical patterns of military mapmaking 
and generally conforms to the structure of military orga-
nizations and operations. Furthermore, the usefulness of 
Woodward’s matrix as a conceptual framework indicates 
its broader applicability for studying how military orga-
nizations view and map their surroundings. As such, this 
article examines how Woodward’s schema can be applied 
to the academic study of military mapmaking and argues 
that it is indeed the right tool for approaching this type of 
cartographic endeavor.
What recommends Woodward’s structure over other car-
tographic models for the study of military mapmaking 
is how it incorporates actors who contribute to the car-
tographic process but do not participate directly in map-
making. This contrasts with other, simpler models for 
conceptualizing mapmaking such as that put forward by 
P. C. Muerhcke (1972) and elaborated upon by Arthur 
Robinson and Barbara Petchenik (1975, 99) and Harold 
Moellering (1980, 14). Whereas these other models focus 
heavily on the map and the information that it commu-
nicates, Woodward’s model explores more fully how this 
information is gathered, analyzed, and used. These differ-
ences give Woodward’s framework a distinct advantage in 
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the context of military cartography, in which the informa-
tion being mapped is often difficult to gather and ambigu-
ous. Furthermore, the resulting map product is usually put 
to immediate use in ways that prompt renewed mapping 
activity. Thus, Woodward’s emphasis on data gathering 
and analysis, as well as on map use, leaves his model better 
suited for studying military cartography. Moreover, one 
of its best uses is translating military jargon and organi-
zational complexity into terms more accessible to people 
outside the military community.
Indeed, military cartography appears to be isolated from 
the broader cartographic and geographic fields, at least 
in the US academic community. With a few notable ex-
ceptions (e.g., Pearson 2002; Schulten 2012; Fedman and 
Karacas 2012) academic cartographers have engaged only 
tangentially with the maps produced by military organiza-
tions. Rachel Woodward, in her article outlining emerg-
ing research in military geography, noted that almost no 
studies have addressed how military units view and con-
ceptualize terrain (Woodward 2014, 48). Furthermore, 
Cheryl McGeachan has noted that the centenary of World 
War I provides an opportunity to study various geograph-
ical facets of that conflict, including how militaries view 
and visualize battlefields (McGeachan 2014, 827). Even 
so, neither of these scholars advocated David Woodward’s 
framework as a tool to address these gaps in knowledge.
Woodward’s (1974) article has been praised for looking 
beyond map content to the actual production process, as 
well as the form of the maps as artifact, and creating a uni-
fied system that examines not just how maps are created 
but also how they are used (Edney 2005, 19). But despite 
its impact on conceptual thinking, Woodward’s suggested 
framework—concisely laid out in a series of matrices—has 
exerted little influence on how researchers have structured 
their projects.
The isolation of academic military cartography and the 
underutilization of Woodward’s framework may be inter-
related. Indeed, they provide an exciting opportunity to 
wade into a largely-unexplored field of cartographic en-
deavor (Woodward 2014, 47). One reason for the schol-
arly isolation of military cartography may be the lack of 
a proper tool for academics to approach what to most 
must be a very foreign culture in the military communi-
ty (McGeachan 2014, 826–7). Similarly, Woodward’s 
suggested framework may have remained generally unused 
because few non-military research topics are well-suited for 
its application. By contrast, I argue here that Woodward’s 
framework is particularly useful for studying how military 
organizations produce and use maps.
Military organizations produce maps internally at a prodi-
gious rate and across a broad range of subjects, from com-
plicated assaults using diverse weapon systems to mandated 
environmental impact statements and even base landscape 
beautification. These map products are used throughout 
the entire military decision-making process, from oper-
ational planning through after-action reviews, which in 
turn influence the creation of yet more maps in a contin-
uous cartographic cycle. Furthermore, Woodward’s four-
row matrix mirrors the influential observe-orient- decide-act 
(OODA) loop suggested by US Air Force colonel John 
Boyd (Hammond 2004, 1). The OODA loop model has 
exerted a powerful influence on military thinking in re-
cent decades, and its mark can be seen on how US Army 
doctrine conceives and communicates the flow of military 
operations (Mostaghni 2010, 49; US Army 2012, vi). This 
cyclic activity makes Woodward’s framework a powerful 
tool for studying military cartography and, by extension, 
how military units and individuals look at landscapes.
To illustrate these arguments, this paper presents an ex-
amination of the operational mapmaking conducted by 
the British Army’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) 
during the 3rd Battle of Gaza—fought on the Palestinian 
Front of World War I—as a case study to demonstrate 
how Woodward’s framework can be applied to the study of 
military cartography. Specifically, the EEF created a series 
of “operation” maps throughout the October-December 
1917 Gaza battle to track the locations of their own units 
and those of their Turkish opponents. These maps were 
notable in that they differed substantially from other “or-
der-of-battle” and “situation” or “position” maps produced 
by the various belligerents during the war and also because 
the British 7th Field Survey Company—the cartographic 
component of the EEF—issued an edition of these maps 
every day during the entire six-week course of the cam-
paign, with each succeeding map materially influenced by 
those that preceded it (Collier 2008, 10). These maps were 
the product of a military intelligence/cartography system 
that provides an ideal setting for applying Woodward’s 
framework.
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DAVID  WO ODWARD’S  SUGGESTED  FR A MEWORK  AND  I TS  PL ACE  IN  CARTO GR APH IC 
SCH OL ARSH IP
In his 1974 article, David Woodward suggested a 
framework for studying cartography that divided the pro-
duction, distribution, and use of maps into four consec-
utive phases (Table 1). These phases are represented by 
horizontal rows on the table: information gathering, infor-
mation processing, document distribution, and document 
use. Each row is then divided into two vertical columns 
that account for the process of production and the result-
ing product. The production column is further subdivided 
to account for the personnel, techniques, and tools active 
within each row of the table. This model is cyclical, both 
within and between phases, insofar as the product from 
each phase—and also each line within the phases—in-
forms both the form and content of the subsequent carto-
graphic activities (Woodward 1974, 109). In many cases—
and particularly in military cartography—the entire 
mapmaking process is cyclic, with each final map product 
initiating a new mapping cycle.
As Matthew Edney (2005, 23) has noted, Woodward’s 
framework was a key influence in moving the cartograph-
ic discipline away from its historical roots—attempts to 
create a science of mapmaking and the study of map con-
tent—towards a humanistic approach that allowed a more 
critical examination of historical maps and the processes 
and circumstances that created them (Harley 1989a, 3). It 
accomplished this not by nullifying the study of map con-
tent, but by integrating this study—defined by the prod-
uct column of the framework—with the form of the maps, 
which permeates the entire matrix, most prominently in 
the production columns (Edney 2005, 20). Woodward’s 
matrix also encourages scholars to classify map history 
studies within one or more cells of the table (Woodward 
1974, 114). The penultimate expression of Woodward’s 
humanistic influence on the academic discipline of cartog-
raphy is the ongoing effort to create the multi-volume en-
cyclopedic History of Cartography, which broadly empha-
sizes the history of the mapping process in the growth of 
the cartographic field and examines historically each cell 
of the mapping process (Freundlich 2011, 341).
More specifically, Woodward’s framework has been in-
fluential in the scholarship of numerous academics, most 
notably his peer, J. B. Harley (1989b), but also many oth-
ers, including Arthur Robinson and Barbara Petchenik 
in their 1975 Cartographica article, and Lydia Pulsipher 
(1987). It was also the subject, initially, of criticism that its 
structure failed to account for the cultural and historical 
context in which maps are created and used and that it 
overemphasized production over product (form over con-
tent), issues that Woodward addressed in his later scholar-
ship (Edney 2005, 20).
That said, perhaps the most potent criticism of Woodward’s 
framework may be that it has been rarely used to frame an 
in-depth research project. When the framework has been 
used, it has general served to classify a scholar’s contribu-
tion within the larger structure of a cartographic system, 
rather than to provide internal structure for the research 
project. Even so, a good example of a broad application of 
Woodward’s framework to structure a project is Pulsipher’s 
(1987) examination of 17th-century mapping on the island 
of Montserrat. However, she acknowledges that, though 
Woodward’s thinking influenced her entire project, she 
only utilized portions of his framework (Pulsipher 1987, 
421). A broad survey of cartographic literature, includ-
ing review articles by Mark Monmonier (2007), and by 
Michael Finn and Diana Thunen (2013), failed to locate 
other scholars who have used Woodward’s model to struc-
ture their research. So, why the limited application of his 
framework?
The answer to this question lies partially in the fact that 
not every map and not every cartographic process lends 
itself to the full application of this model. Woodward 
himself noted that “many maps do not progress beyond 
the manuscript stage, but they are nevertheless subject to 
distribution…and eventual use by the reader” (Woodward 
1974, 113). Of course, many mapping systems have prod-
ucts that never reach their intended recipients. Indeed, in 
the civilian sphere, a broadly diverse community of users 
often creates a decentralized system not readily accommo-
dated by the Woodward framework. One could further 
argue that the contents of the matrix are too specific or 
rigid to keep pace with the technological advances in map-
making that have occurred in recent decades. Regardless 
of the reason, over the past four decades scholars have de-
cided—either deliberately or by default—that Woodward’s 
framework was not an appropriate tool for structuring 
their research.
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Information 
Gathering
Production
Product
Personnel Techniques Tools
Observer Observation Physical and Mental Faculties Image
Surveyor
Surveying
Data Gathering
Surveying Instruments, 
Questionnaires, etc. Data
Information 
Processing
Designer Design Design Tools Specifications
Editor Compilation Compilation Tools Worksheet
Draftsman Drafting Drafting Tools Manuscript
Engraver Engraving Engraving Tools Plate
Printer Printing Presses, etc. Printed Map
Document 
Distribution
Publisher Publishing Publishing Facilities Published Map
Seller Marketing Marketing Facilities Marketed Map
Document 
User
Librarian
Acquisition
Storage
Retrieval
Library Facilities Map
User Interpretation Physical and Mental Faculties Image
Table 1. David Woodward’s suggested framework for studying the history of cartography (from Woodward [1974]).
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By contrast, the mapping process in military organiza-
tions is markedly more centralized, with units gathering 
and analyzing data, making and distributing maps (paper 
and digital), and using these maps to plan and conduct 
operations that generate further data, which must in turn 
be processed and mapped (Armenis 2010, 207). These 
comments refer generally to large-scale tactical and op-
erational maps used by individual units as opposed to 
small-scale strategic maps used for matters of national 
policy. As an example, the staff of a present-day US in-
fantry battalion (approximately 700–800 soldiers) plan-
ning an operation will create and distribute maps dealing 
with cross-country mobility, expected enemy positions, 
planned friendly maneuvers, planned artillery fire, medi-
cal evacuation schemes, resupply schemes, communication 
networks, the employment of aerial assets, and any num-
ber of other relevant topics (US Army 2010, 2-1 to 2-14). 
These all inform operations that, one way or another, alter 
the staff’s understanding of the battleground so that a new 
cycle of mapping and map distribution is required to keep 
abreast of the changes. Woodward’s suggested framework 
is an excellent tool for studying and analyzing this type 
of mapmaking. However, making the model relevant re-
quires a modification of Table 1 to better reflect the orga-
nizational structure of a military unit.
M O D I F Y I N G  WO O DWA R D ’S  FR A M E WO RK  TO  REFL EC T  M I L I TA RY  O RGA N IZ AT I O N S
Whereas the cells in Woodward’s table are necessar-
ily generic in content and focused on the traditional civil 
and commercial spheres of mapping, military mapping re-
quires several adjustments. Accordingly, Table 2 is a mod-
ification designed to represent the cartographic system of 
a generic military formation. This table would be appro-
priate for examining almost any military unit that makes 
maps currently or in the past. The following section details 
the differences between this generic military framework 
and Woodward’s original matrix. Later, the EEF case 
study will demonstrate this modification’s usefulness in 
historical research.
Beginning in the production column of the informa-
tion-gathering phase, in the “Personnel” sub-column the 
generalized “observer” and “surveyor” entries are replaced 
with their military equivalents: reconnaissance troops, 
who scout for the enemy ahead of the main force, and 
technical intelligence-gathering means such as signal in-
tercepts and aerial reconnaissance. Obviously this latter 
source is very broad and has evolved as technology has 
advanced, but the mission of scouting forces has actual-
ly changed little since antiquity. Since modern militaries 
(World War I and later) are generally less concerned with 
mapping terrain than with populating maps with tactical-
ly and operationally relevant information, the surveying 
element of Woodward’s table disappears in these cells. The 
“techniques” column contains the broad methods—both 
tactical and technical—by which these information-gath-
ering entities operate, just as the “tools” column contains 
their generic equipment. The products of this phase in 
Table 2 are the reports sent back by the scouting forces 
and the information gathered by technical means. These 
represent fragmentary pieces of data that require analysis 
to craft them into useful intelligence, a process that occurs 
in the information-processing phase.
This next row of this modified framework focuses on those 
individuals who first decide what information is relevant 
to transmit back to higher headquarters—itself an act of 
analysis—and the staff officers and commanders who an-
alyze the data received. Military officers use standardized 
procedures (doctrine) to guide them in this analysis, but 
also have leeway for their own decision-making (US Army 
2012, 2-5). The products of this phase include planning 
priorities issued by commanders to guide the work of the 
staff officers, as well as summaries that distill the diverse 
raw data into a useful common picture of the area of oper-
ations, perhaps in the form of pre-distribution draft maps. 
The graphic representation and dissemination of this pic-
ture in a final polished map occurs in the document-dis-
tribution phase.
Military mapmaking has long been the responsibility of 
headquarters staff, but prior to World War I, military car-
tographers had generally focused their efforts on charting 
physical terrain, whereas during and after this conf lict 
the emphasis shifted to plotting tactical and operational 
information on pre-existing maps, and distributing these 
maps to subordinate units through an established chain of 
command (Collier 1994, 101–3; Collier and Inkpen 2001, 
145). In this endeavor, militaries have developed standard-
ized map symbols to streamline cartographic communi-
cation and reduce confusion (US Army 2004, vi). These 
Cartographic Perspectives, Number 81, 201528 | Using the Right Tool – Radunzel
Information 
Gathering
Production
Product
Personnel Techniques Tools
Reconnaissance 
Forces
Patrols
Observation
Physical and Mental 
Faculties
Vehicles
Optics
Situation Reports
Technical Intelligence-
gathering Means
Signal Intercepts, 
Image Intelligence, 
Electronic Intelligence, 
etc.
Radios, Aircraft, 
Cameras, Sensors, 
etc.
Raw Data
Information 
Processing
Unit Leaders Physical and Mental Faculties Report Formats Operational Priorities
Communication 
Specialists and 
Couriers
Data Transmission Communication Networks Compiled Reports
Staff Officers Military Decision-Making Process
Military Doctrine 
Training
Intelligence 
Summaries
Recommendations
Common Operating 
Picture
Document 
Distribution
Staff Mapmakers Standard Symbols and Forms
Physical and Digital 
Mapmaking Tools
Tactical, Operations, 
and Logistical Maps
Communication 
Specialists and 
Couriers
Intelligence 
Distribution
Operation Orders
Chain of Command Operations Orders
Document 
User
Unit Leaders Military Decision-Making Process
Physical and Mental 
Faculties
Unit Orders and 
Operations
Tactical Military Units Tactical Operations Tactical Doctrine and Training More Intelligence
Table 2. Woodward’s framework modified to reflect the structure of generic military cartographic systems. 
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symbols communicate intelligence, analysis, and inten-
tions to subordinates or—in the case of upward flowing 
information—to superiors.
In the document-use phase, subordinate commanders and 
units use the maps produced by the headquarters staff to 
plan and execute operations that move forces into contact 
with the enemy (or not) and thus alter the battlefield con-
ditions—or at least the perception thereof—in one way or 
another. This in turn generates reports from these forma-
tions back up the chain of command, providing raw data 
that initiate a new planning and mapping cycle. This phase 
differs perhaps more than any other from the content of 
Woodward’s matrix. In his framework, the final product 
is deposited in a library for general access and reference, 
to be used for some as-yet unspecified future task, perhaps 
unrelated to the original purpose of the map. Military 
maps, in contrast to their civilian counterparts, are gen-
erally created for an immediate purpose under rapidly 
changing conditions and are thus more immediately use-
ful. This fact highlights the cyclic nature of military carto-
graphic systems.
Each of the four phases in this military cartographic sys-
tem builds on the preceding phase, though they may occur 
concurrently. And as Woodward noted about his original 
framework, not every step of this military mapping cycle 
will necessarily occur in every case. Often a map might 
remain in draft form for use solely by the headquarters 
staff. Moreover, because of a dearth of reconnaissance in-
formation, staff officers might be forced to plot speculative 
or otherwise questionable information (US Army 2012, 
9-10). Even so, the defining characteristic of this system is 
that it is cyclical, with each map and mapping cycle mate-
rially influencing the content of subsequent map products.
Perhaps the ultimate modern expression of this system 
is the networked digital moving map display fielded by 
the US military. This technology (a dual system called 
FBCB2/Blue Force Tracker) equips combat vehicles and 
command posts with a computer terminal that networks 
with other vehicles and headquarters equipped with the 
same system. Linked to a GPS receiver, the terminal auto-
matically transmits the location of the vehicle across a dig-
ital radio network and receives and plots the location of all 
other similarly equipped friendly units. Furthermore, the 
soldier operating the system can manually plot observed 
enemy forces or obstacles directly onto the digital map 
(Armenis 2010, 207). This information is then transmitted 
to an appropriate headquarters for approval before being 
broadcast across the entire network, ensuring that every 
sub-unit possesses a common operational picture of the 
battlefield situation and allowing commanders to rapidly 
respond to changing tactical conditions (US Army 2010, 
5-5). At times, this mapping cycle can occur in seconds.
Recent technology has drastically shortened the military 
mapping cycle, but its actual form and concept are not 
new. One clear application of this cartographic concept is 
the operation mapping technique practiced by the EEF in 
Palestine during the 3rd Battle of Gaza in late 1917. This 
battle is an excellent case study for demonstrating both the 
cyclical nature of military mapping and the relevance of 
Woodward’s cartographic framework.
T H E  E E F ’S  O P E R AT I O N  M A P S:  A  C A R TO G R A P H I C  C A S E  S T U DY
The Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s (EEF) car-
tographic effort during the 3rd Battle of Gaza was a so-
phisticated process given the relatively primitive tech-
nology available at the time. During the six weeks that 
this battle raged—from late October to mid-Decem-
ber 1917—the EEF’s intelligence staff and the 7th Field 
Survey Company (FSC) produced a series of operation 
maps showing the positions of friendly units and oppos-
ing Turkish forces, with a new edition of the map printed 
and distributed every day. A complete set of the original 
editions of this map series are in the British National 
Archives filed as WO 153/1035/2 and WO 153/1043. The 
transformation of raw data into a polished operation map 
is an excellent example of the military cartographic cycle 
and exemplifies the modification of Woodward’s frame-
work seen in Table 2.
This section first illustrates how the modified cartographic 
model conceptually organizes the production of the op-
eration maps by the EEF (Table 3). It then assesses the 
value of a rigorous application of Woodward’s framework, 
which demonstrates this model’s applicability to military 
cartography. The section then concludes with some brief 
comments on the effectiveness of the operation mapping 
cycle as practiced by the EEF, including the limitations 
imposed by the available technology and the structure of 
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Intelligence Officers Signal Intercepts Wireless Sets Intercepted Messages
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Patrols
Ground and Aerial 
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Aircraft, Cameras, 
Optics
Aerial Photographs, 
Patrol Reports
Interrogators Prisoner/Deserter Interrogations Mental Faculties
Prisoner/Deserter 
Statements
Agent Networks Train Watching Communication Networks Agent Reports
Information 
Processing
Communication 
Specialists
Situation and 
Intelligence Reports
Report Formats and 
Communication 
Networks
Situation Reports
Intelligence Officers
Multi- and Single-
Source Analysis 
Methods
Mental Faculties, 
Standardized Forms
Intelligence 
Summaries
Compilation, 
Drafting, Engraving, 
Printing Tools
Pre-printed Base 
Maps, Colored 
Engraving Plates
Draft Operation 
Maps
Document 
Distribution
Staff Officers Daily Intelligence Dissemination
Chain of Command, 
Subordinate Staffs Operation Orders
7th FSC
Compilation, 
Drafting, Engraving, 
Printing
Pre-printed Base 
Maps, Compilation, 
Drafting, Engraving, 
Printing Tools
Operation Maps
Document 
User
EEF Commander, 
Subordinate 
Commanders
Military Decision-
Making Process
Tactical Doctrine and 
Training
Operation Decisions, 
Unit Orders and 
Movements
GHQ and Corps 
Staffs
Enemy Capabilities 
and Intentions 
Analysis
Physical and Mental 
Faculties More Intelligence
Table 3. Woodward’s framework modified to reflect the specific structure of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force during the 3rd Battle of 
Gaza, 1917.
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EEF mapping activity. These observations illustrate the 
broader import of Woodward’s table in streamlining map-
making in rapidly-changing and time-sensitive contexts.
H I S T O R I C A L  C O N T E X T
The Palestine Campaign grew out of the British Empire’s 
strategic imperative to safeguard the Suez Canal and the 
sea lines of communication to India. Several large Turkish 
raids on this waterway in the early years of World War I 
convinced the British of the necessity to move the front 
lines forward across the Sinai Peninsula. However, the 
forces necessary for pushing the front forward to the 
Palestine Frontier were also too large to justify their as-
signment to a purely defensive role once they reached the 
Ottoman border.
Accordingly, the British government commissioned the 
EEF’s commander, General Archibald Murray, and his 
eventual successor, General Edmund Allenby, to invade 
Palestine and capture Jerusalem before Christmas 1917. 
The British forces under Murray attempted twice—in the 
1st and 2nd Battles of Gaza—to breach the Turkish fron-
tier defenses arrayed on a line stretching from the town 
of Gaza on the Mediterranean coast southeast to the 
crossroads town of Beersheba. These failures prompted 
the British Imperial General Staff to replace Murray with 
Allenby and convinced the EEF of the need to better track 
the locations of units in the Turkish order of battle, a need 
that gave rise to the operation mapping technique (Wavell 
1936, 94–114; Sheffy 1998, 207–14). The EEF staff used 
the resulting operation maps to track the location of each 
British and Turkish regiment in the opposing armies’ or-
ders of battle. The maps also helped the EEF command-
ers make operational decisions about how to respond to 
Turkish troop movements, much as modern networked 
dynamic mapping systems help contemporary military of-
ficers oversee combat (Armenis 2010, 208).
The 3rd Battle of Gaza occurred in three consecutive op-
erational phases. First, the EEF under Allenby launched 
a thoroughly pre-planned assault on the Turkish eastern 
flank at Beersheba that drew the enemy reserves to that 
end of the line before a second assault struck the weakened 
Gaza defenses in the west, a sequence that was significant-
ly informed by the information communicated through 
the operation maps (Figure 1; Meinertzhagen 1917, 46). 
In the second phase of the battle the Turkish army evacu-
ated their defensive line and retreated northward, pursued 
by the British, until the front stabilized at a latitude gener-
ally running through Jerusalem (Figure 2). The operation 
maps were least useful during this phase as the chaotic 
and rapidly changing operational context meant that the 
twenty-four hour operation-mapping cycle was too slow to 
Figure 1. In the first phase of the 3rd Battle of Gaza, the British 
forces launched successive attacks (in red) against both flanks of 
the Turkish line (in green), first at Beersheba, then at Gaza.
Figure 2. In the second phase, the British pursued the retreating 
Turkish army northward until the front stabilized on a new line 
running generally from Jaffa to Jerusalem.
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allow for timely analysis and distribution of relevant data. 
In the third phase of the battle the EEF began a slow 
and deliberate eastward advance into the Judean hills, 
which resulted in the capture of Jerusalem on 9 December 
(Figure 3). As the Turkish army was too battered at this 
point to effectively counter the British advance, the pur-
pose of the operation maps in this phase appears to have 
changed, with the maps becoming a historical record 
meant to communicate the EEF’s accomplishments to an 
external audience (Collier 2008, 13).
T H E  E E F  C A R T O G R A P H I C  SYS T E M
The first step in applying the modified framework to the 
EEF’s structure is to define the elements in this force that 
engaged in the information-gathering phase of the mili-
tary cartographic system (see Table 3). These included the 
infantry and cavalry units that conducted ground patrols 
to ascertain the positions of the opposing Turkish force 
as well as their aerial counterparts in the Royal Flying 
Corps (RFC). Furthermore, the EEF employed technical 
means to gather information about their enemy, including 
intercepted Turkish wireless messages and reports from 
agents behind the lines. While each of these sources ex-
celled at providing different types of information, the 
most profitable source of intelligence appears to have been 
the statements of Turkish deserters who left their units 
to seek asylum with the British army, and the broadly 
similar statements of prisoners captured during combat 
operations.
The data generated by these patrols, intercepts, and inter-
rogations took the form of reports sent back to the EEF 
General Headquarters (GHQ ) by scouting elements 
(found in the war diaries of the relevant units in the British 
National Archives, collection WO 95 for ground units 
and AIR 1/2210/209/26/2 for RFC patrols), intercepted 
messages (some preserved in the Gerard Clauson Papers 
at the British Imperial War Museum, London), and notes 
gleaned from the interrogation of deserters (WO 157/717 
through WO 157/722). As in the more generalized mil-
itary framework (Table 2), these disparate raw data re-
quired further analysis by the EEF’s staff to transform 
them into useful information before they could inform a 
coherent picture the Palestine front.
In the information-processing phase of the mapping cycle 
the GHQ staff attempted to compile and analyze the in-
formation arriving from these diverse sources to produce 
operationally useful intelligence for the unit commanders. 
Staff officers gathered these data into daily intelligence 
summaries (WO 157/717 through 722) in which they 
synthesized this information into a coherent whole. These 
daily summary documents represent a clear link between 
the information gathered by the EEF reconnaissance forc-
es and the operation maps insofar as specific entries in the 
intelligence summaries appear regularly as symbols and 
annotations on the maps.
Another facet of this information-processing effort ap-
pears to have been the creation of draft operation maps 
(Figure 4), which were used to track and analyze the data 
received at GHQ during the day (Meinertzhagen 1960, 
225). These draft maps differed from the final daily edi-
tions in that they were unpolished and only showed the 
positions of the British forces while ignoring their Turkish 
opponents. These draft maps were intended to inform the 
central product of the mapping cycle: the daily operation 
maps printed during the document-distribution phase.
In the third phase of the EEF’s cartographic cycle, the 
GHQ staff intelligence officers submitted the latest cop-
ies of their daily draft maps to the draftsmen of the 7th 
FSC for copying and printing. These draftsmen creat-
ed colored plates for overprinting the red (British) and 
green (Turkish) unit symbols onto pre-printed base maps 
(Maule 1919, 13). This process occurred each evening, 
Figure 3. In the final phase, the British forces conducted a 
deliberate advance into the Judean Hills, occupying Jerusalem on 
9 December.
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with the draft maps delivered to the 7th FSC at 4pm and 
the final polished copies available for distribution at 6pm 
(Meinertzhagen 1960, 225). The maps were then delivered 
by courier to the EEF’s corps and division commanders, 
with enough copies printed to supply at least one map to 
each unit, with additional copies retained at EEF GHQ 
and at the 7th FSC (7th FSC War Diary, entries for 28 
October through 9 December). These maps would have 
accompanied orders sent by GHQ to its subordinate head-
quarters, which were themselves informed by the freshly 
produced maps.
In the final phase of this specialized cartographic frame-
work, the EEF GHQ , as well as its subordinate corps and 
division commanders, used the operation maps to make 
decisions about forthcoming maneuvers. One clear exam-
ple of such document use occurred in the early stages of 
the battle. The 2 November operation map showed strong 
Turkish reserves moving to the far eastern flank to count-
er the British advance, a movement that helped prompt 
the start of the British attack at the western end of the 
line (Figure 5). However, higher level officers at GHQ , 
worried that the maps would discourage the British com-
manders at the eastern end of the line from aggressively 
pursuing their own attacks, ordered these maps retracted 
(Meinertzhagen 1917, 46). Accordingly, the 3 November 
map showed the Turkish reserves back in their original lo-
cations, though now represented by hollow box symbols to 
denote uncertainty about the location of the Turkish units 
(Figure 6).
This episode illustrates that the operation maps influenced 
decisions made by the EEF’s commanding officers both 
at the GHQ and the corps level. These decisions guided 
the movements of British forces and patrols, maneuver-
ing them into positions where they could observe their 
Turkish opponents (or not, in many cases) and report 
Figure 4. An excerpt from a draft operation map drawn during 
the opening day of the Gaza offensive. Note the obviously hand-
drawn symbols and that the map only shows British units, omitting 
Turkish positions. (TNA WO 153/1035/2).
Figure 5. Facsimile excerpt from the 2 November operation 
map that shows a strong Turkish reinforcement of their eastern 
flank to counter the British attack there. Note in particular 
the 19th and 26th Divisions to the right represented by large 
rectangles presumably denoting strong formations. The horizontal 
dimension of this figure is approximately 25 kilometers (TNA WO 
153/1035/2).
Figure 6. Facsimile excerpt from the 3 November operation map 
that shows the same area as Figure 5. Note that the symbols 
representing Turkish reserve formations have been removed back 
to their original locations behind the line (left side of the figure) 
and are now marked by hollow box attenuation symbols. The 
horizontal dimension of this figure is approximately 25 kilometers 
(TNA WO 153/1035/2).
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information back to their higher headquarters, beginning 
anew the cartographic cycle that would produce the next 
day’s iteration. Moreover, the EEF staff likely considered 
the operation mapping technique to be successful because 
they reintroduced it in an improved form during Allenby’s 
final 1918 offensive. Furthermore, James T. Kelly, a US 
army officer writing in 1933, suggested that the American 
military was modeling their intelligence maps after the 7th 
FSC operation maps, demonstrating an even broader in-
fluence (Kelly 1933, 42–43).
The process of conceptually organizing the EEF in this 
way revealed the important roles played by even minor en-
tities within the British army, including units that would 
not have participated directly in either reconnaissance or 
mapmaking. For example, one vital element of the EEF 
cartographic system was the communication troops who, 
by their efforts in setting up signal networks, large-
ly controlled the amount and type of information that 
could reach the staff at GHQ. The EEF’s intelligence 
staff could only map information received from those in-
volved in information gathering. The link between the in-
formation-gatherers and the staff was often tenuous and 
restricted, particularly during mobile operations, when the 
communication infrastructure was usually too slow to keep 
pace with the advancing formations. The evidence relating 
to how the maps were actually used in the final phase of 
the framework shed light onto their intended purpose, an-
other facet of this subject that would have remained un-
clear under a more narrow examination restricted solely to 
map content.
This case study demonstrates how a version of Woodward’s 
framework can frame the study of a specific episode of 
historical military cartography. In the case of the EEF, 
this framework is useful for understanding the entire 
cartographic process and drawing conclusions about the 
mapping cycle’s purpose and effectiveness. Indeed, it 
highlighted the fact that the EEF’s twenty-four hour car-
tographic cycle, suited for graphically organizing a stable 
front as existed prior to the start of the British offensive, 
was too slow to cope with the rapidly changing opera-
tional conditions of mobile operations such as those in the 
second phase of the battle. Finally, this conceptual organi-
zation highlights the similarity of the EEF’s cartographic 
activity to present-day digital mapping systems.
CO N C L U S I O N S
A P P L I C AT I O N S  T O  M I L I TA RY  C A R T O G R A P HY
Woodward’s (1974) suggested framework is an 
excellent tool for examining military mapmaking, as long 
as certain limitations are recognized. For the framework 
to be fully appropriate, the military unit studied should 
be of sufficient size and capability to conduct all phases 
of the mapping cycle, from information gathering through 
document use. During World War I this capability was 
generally held at the army level of organization because 
these formations were the smallest to possess the drafting 
and printing equipment necessary for map production. In 
present-day militaries, the ability to conduct a complete 
cartographic cycle occurs as low as the battalion level. In 
each case, lower-level organizations participate in portions 
of this framework, often making their own simple maps 
in the process. As an example, junior sergeants in the US 
Army are trained to draw crude maps in the dirt to rapidly 
communicate plans to the two or three soldiers they lead, 
and young officers are expected to produce rough terrain 
models in the field to brief their platoons and companies 
on planned operations.
Of course, the maps produced by these systems are im-
perfect representations of reality, with their own silences, 
white lies, and inaccuracies that detract from their fideli-
ty as records of the actual course of the battle (Robinson 
and Petchenik 1977, 101; Monmonier 1991, 1–4; Harley 
1989b, 84–85). In the case of the EEF operation maps, 
the editions printed during the mobile second phase of the 
Gaza offensive were nearly useless from a tactical perspec-
tive because they simply did not communicate much usable 
information, and what data they did show were largely 
based on speculation by the intelligence staff. But even in 
such circumstances, Woodward’s framework demonstrates 
that examining an army as an integrated, cyclical carto-
graphic system can be important in trying to understand 
what the cartographers didn’t know, why they didn’t know 
it, and how they attempted to graphically communicate 
uncertainty.
If these l imitations are recognized, the util ity of 
Woodward’s framework in this context becomes obvi-
ous. Large military units, at least since World War I, have 
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acted as cartographic systems that rapidly gather, process, 
and plot spatial information, and then use the resulting 
maps to plan and execute operations. These operations in 
turn generate further information that must be mapped 
and distributed. Whereas only portions of this carto-
graphic cycle may be relevant to most civilian mapping 
activities, the entirety of the framework comes into play 
in the military context. While this case study is an exam-
ple of historical military cartography, this method is just 
as useful—perhaps more so—for studying contemporary 
military cartography.
F U R T H E R  A P P L I C AT I O N S
The method of considering military units as cartograph-
ic systems suggests applications that reach beyond combat 
operations. Furthermore, such contemporary applications 
need not be restricted to military organizations. One ob-
vious example of a potential application of Woodward’s 
framework is the response to the Fukushima reactor disas-
ter in Japan, where the spread of radiation-contaminated 
water needed to be mapped continuously and appropriate 
action taken to protect potential victims. Another example 
is the use of mapping in response to an epidemic to ensure 
efficient distribution of vaccines or the management of a 
quarantine.
On the other hand, the Woodward framework may be 
of more limited utility in studying or designing more 
decentralized crowd-sourced or big-data mapping systems 
such as OpenStreetMap or Google’s influenza mapping 
algorithms. In these systems many or all elements of the 
cartographic process may be ill-defined and difficult to in-
corporate into the framework’s structure (Bennett 2010, 
8). Even so, some of these cartographic activities seem to 
be showing a movement towards more centralized control 
of information processing as well as privileging certain 
types of information gathering to improve the map prod-
ucts’ accuracy and utility (Butler 2013). In these circum-
stances, Woodward’s framework is still a valuable tool for 
analyzing these systems, at least in part.
To conclude, research into historical and contemporary 
military cartography provides a context where scholars 
can make fuller use of Woodward’s framework. Indeed, 
further examinations of the prodigious mapmaking ac-
tivities of military organizations can enrich academic car-
tography (Harley and Woodward 1989, 11–13). As Edney 
noted in his essay about Woodward’s impact on academic 
cartography, “To understand map making and map use as 
human endeavors requires consideration of all mapping 
endeavors and not just those which contributed to the 
present-day concerns of academic cartography” (Edney 
2005, 22). Military cartography is one of these endeavors 
that requires further research, and Woodward’s suggested 
framework is an excellent tool for the job.
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